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Party Identification in an  
Encapsulated Party System:  
The Case of Postauthoritarian Chile 
Matías A. Bargsted and Luis Maldonado 
Abstract: Since the return of democracy, party identification has been 
declining sharply among the Chilean public. We seek to understand this 
process by applying an age-period-cohort analysis to survey data from 
1994 to 2014. In light of the elite-driven and socially uprooted character, 
or what we call the encapsulated nature, of the Chilean party system, we 
hypothesize that cumulative electoral experience has had a negative ef-
fect on party identification and not the positive effect that Converse’s 
(1969) social-learning model would predict. Our findings support these 
expectations but also reveal large period effects that have shrunk the 
overall level of partisan identification and significant cohort effects 
whereby generations born after the 1950s have become less partisan. We 
also uncover important nuances that occur across the various main-
stream political parties. We conclude that all three sources of social 
change are leading toward the extinction of mass partisanship from Chil-
ean society.  
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1 Introduction 
During the past three decades, several Latin American countries have 
experienced dramatic dealignment processes whereby significant por-
tions of the population have ceased supporting or affiliating themselves 
with any of the existing political parties (Lupu 2014; Morgan 2007). In 
Chile this trend has been most noticeable. According to national surveys 
conducted by the Center of Public Studies (Centro de Estudios Publicos, 
CEP) in 1994, more than 70 percent of the Chilean adult population 
mentioned identifying or sympathizing with a political party. By 2014, 
however, this figure had dropped to 32 percent. Although some fluctua-
tions have certainly occurred throughout the years, the trend of a strong 
decline is indisputable (see figure 1a). The magnitude of this change 
surpasses similar tendencies observed in advanced democracies.1 Inter-
estingly, and consistent with recent findings from Navia and Osorio 
(2015), these aggregate trends are not equal across all major Chilean 
parties. As figure 1(b) reveals, the Christian Democratic Party (Partido 
Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) was the only party to experience a strong 
decline in supporters up to 2005. In contrast, identification with right-
wing parties (Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Inde-
pendiente, UDI) and National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN)) and 
center-left parties (Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia, 
PPD), Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de Chile, PS), and Social Demo-
cratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Social Demócrata, PRSD)) remained 
stable and even increased slightly. Nonetheless, identification with these 
parties also started to systematically decrease after the 2005 presidential 
election.  
This decline of partisanship has not gone unnoticed among scholars 
(Luna and Altman 2001; Navia and Osorio 2015; Segovia 2009; Siavelis 
2016). Unsurprisingly, many of them have expressed deep concerns 
about the possible negative implications it might have for the Chilean 
political system. 
  
                                                 
1  Dalton (2016) provides some trends in party identification in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and (West) Germany that span several decades. 
The country with the sharpest drop is Germany (from slightly more than 80 
percent in mid-1970s to around 60 percent in recent years). 
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Figure 1. Party Identification in Chile by Year, 1994–2014 
 
 
Source:  CEP surveys. 
Weakly supported political parties are expected to encounter more diffi-
culties when performing tasks that are essential to a democracy, such as 
gathering political support for new policies, recruiting prospective politi-
cal candidates, mobilizing voters to participate in the democratic process, 
and articulating heterogeneous social and political interests (Dalton, 
McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000). 
The objective of this article2 is twofold. First, we seek to understand 
how this process of partisan decline took place. We do this by conduct-
ing an age-period-cohort (APC) analysis of repeated cross-sectional sur-
vey data from 1994 to 2014, which allows us to identify the sources of 
change behind the aggregate decline. Such an analysis entails distinguish-
ing whether this process occurred through generational replacement or 
through individual-level attitudinal change, or a combination of both. By 
identifying the microlevel sources of aggregate change, we shed light on 
a dimension of partisan decline that is commonly left unexplored. Fur-
                                                 
2  Acknowledgments: Previous versions of this article benefited from the com-
ments of participants at the 2014 Regional Conference of the World Associa-
tion for Public Opinion Research (Santiago, Chile), attendees at the seminar 
hosted by the Institute of Political Science of the Pontificia Universidad Católi-
ca de Chile, as well as those made by Carolina Segovia, Mauricio Morales, 
Nicolás Somma, and our anonymous reviewers.   
Funding: This research was supported by a CONICYT–FONDECYT Initia-
tion Grant (No. 11140746) provided by the Chilean Ministry of Education and 
the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (Chilean grant CONI-
CYT/FONDAP/15130009). 
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thermore, on the basis of these methodological advantages, we exploit 
Chilean democracy as a diachronic single-case study (Gerring 2006) that 
allows us to identify APC effects and controlling for macro explanations 
of partisanship, such as economic performance and political stability. 
Second, we look to analyze these trends in light of Converse’s 
(1969) influential social-learning model, which contends that individuals’ 
propensity to identify with political parties should increase as they accu-
mulate electoral experience. We claim that the process of partisan decline 
that has occurred in Chile is, in fact, at odds with Converse’s (1969) 
model. As many authors argue, following the country’s democratic tran-
sition, it witnessed the rapid consolidation of a highly institutionalized 
multiparty system (Castiglioni and Kaltwasser 2017; Kitschelt et al. 2010; 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995) that not only resembled the party system in 
place before the democratic breakdown in 1973 (Siavelis 1997; Valen-
zuela and Scully 1997) but also remained stable until recently. Therefore, 
following Converse’s (1969) model, the Chilean party system’s stability 
during the period under observation should have promoted, all else be-
ing equal, the rise of partisan attachments, not their decline. 
We argue that this anomaly can be explained if one considers the 
particularities of the Chilean party system. Following recent literature, we 
claim that the current Chilean party system has also become increasingly 
elite-driven and socially uprooted, or – as we put it –encapsulated. Chile-
an citizens have taken notice of this phenomenon and have become 
deeply distrustful of political parties and their practices. Consequently, 
we contend that the accumulation of electoral experience (i.e., voters’ 
direct interaction with parties) will decrease voters’ propensity to identify 
with parties, not increase it as Converse’s (1969) model suggests. This 
theoretical assertion leads us to expect a negative association between 
aging and party identification, and not a positive relationship as virtually 
all comparative political behavior research has previously shown (Alwin 
and Krosnick 1991; Claggett 1981; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Dinas 
2014). By testing this microlevel implication, the present study shows 
that the development of party identification is conditional on the links 
between parties and citizens that characterize the political context. As 
such, we believe this study contributes to our understanding of determi-
nants of mass partisanship in new and old democracies. Moreover, 
studying the development of partisanship in a nonadvanced democracy 
such as Chile enables us to examine the explanatory factors suggested by 
the literature in new contexts and thus reevaluate the explanatory power 
of theories (e.g., social-learning hypothesis). 
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Our statistical results confirm our expectations. Contrary to Con-
verse’s (1969) social-learning hypothesis, they uncover moderately sized 
negative aging effects whereby voters’ propensity to identify with parties 
decreases as they become older. Although the sign of this aging effect is 
consistently negative, its magnitude varies across parties, with left-wing 
parties experiencing the sharpest declines. We also find strong period 
effects that have shrunk levels of party identification for all age groups 
simultaneously; though these also show relevant differences across party 
groups. Finally, we find negative cohort effects, with generations born 
after the 1950s having become progressively less partisan. Based on 
these findings, we conclude that all three sources of social change have 
consistently led to the extinction of mass partisanship from Chilean 
society. Given the importance of political parties in democratic systems, 
these simultaneous trends could cause some worrisome problems in the 
near future for the Chilean political system. 
The article is organized as follows: In the next section, we review 
the nature of the postauthoritarian Chilean party system. We then review 
Converse’s (1969) learning model and consider the relationship between 
cumulative experience and partisanship in light of the nature of the cur-
rent Chilean party system. The section after that details all relevant in-
formation about our APC methodology, research design, and statistical 
specification. After this, we review the empirical results before discussing 
them and concluding in the final section. 
2 The Ambiguous Nature of the Chilean  
Party System 
Since redemocratization in 1989, the Chilean party system has revolved 
around two multiparty coalitions: the center-left Coalition of Parties for 
Democracy (composed of the PS, PPD, PDC, and PRSD and originally 
created to oppose the military regime) and the center-right coalition 
Alliance for Change (composed of the RN, UDI, and various small rotat-
ing political organizations and supporter of the military regime). The 
Coalition of Parties for Democracy governed between 1990 and 2010 
before being defeated by the Alliance. In 2014 the New Majority – a 
renewed version of the center-left collation that also included the Com-
munist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile, PCC) – defeated the Alliance 
to take back power.  
Up until 2015, the Chilean party system strongly resembled the par-
ty system in place before the democratic breakdown of 1973, albeit with 
some important differences (e.g., its less polarized nature). Many of the 
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parties that dominate the political spectrum are the same ones that did so 
prior to 1973, while others were founded toward the end of the military 
dictatorship but retained clear connections to previous party organiza-
tions (Garretón 1990).3  
Both party systems also share a similar left–right ideological align-
ment, with one or two electorally relevant parties situated on the right, 
the PS and the PCC located on the left, and the PDC located in between 
(Valenzuela and Scully 1997; Siavelis 1997; Navia and Osorio 2015), 
though ideologically closer to the left-wing parties (Bonilla et al. 2011). 
As many regional specialists argue, the Chilean party system is 
among the most institutionalized of Latin America (Luna and Altman 
2011; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Payne et al. 2006). One reason for 
this claim is that since the return of democracy, Chile has experienced 
low levels of electoral volatility, which is a common indicator of party 
system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). As shown in 
figure 2(a), Chile had some of the lowest volatility levels in Latin Ameri-
ca between 1990 and 2010.  
Following the prominent work of Kitschelt et al. (2010), the Chilean 
party system also stands out due to its high levels of programmatic struc-
turation.4 In each of the indicators that Kitschelt et al. employ to meas-
ure this concept, the Chilean party system systematically ranks highest or 
among the highest in their sample of 12 Latin American countries. For 
instance, they found that the average level of ideological cohesion of 
political parties (measured using within-party similarity of legislators’ 
opinions on several issues) was highest among the Chilean sample of 
representatives (Kitschelt et al. 2010; see chapter 5). Despite these favor-
able traits, several weaknesses of Chile’s postauthoritarian party system 
have become increasingly apparent to scholars. 
 
  
                                                 
3  For example, the electoral records of the PRSD, formerly known as the Radical 
Party, trace back to the nineteenth century. The PDC was founded in 1957 and 
led the Eduardo Frei Montalva government between 1960 and 1964. The PS 
and PCC (founded in 1933 and 1922, respectively) were the main supporters of 
the Popular Union coalition that governed between 1970 and 1973.  
4  This refers, in rough terms, to the extent to which political competition is 
structured around coherent and substantive policy alternatives that parties of-
fer, and the degree to which citizens cast their votes based on the programmat-
ic proposals of parties, as opposed to clientelistic incentives (Kitschelt et al. 
2010). 
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Figure 2. Comparative Features of the Chilean Postauthoritarian Party 
System 
 
Note:  Plot A is based on data from Alcantara (2012). Plot B is elaborated with data 
from Kitschelt (2013). Plot C is based on the July 2014 CEP survey. Plot D us-
es data from Singer (2016). The advanced democracies in plot C include Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the UK, and the US. 
Some resemble the elements that Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (2016) 
identify as increasing the chances of party-building in Latin American 
countries, such as developing strong levels of organizational cohesion 
and sustained linkages with citizens; others are more specific to the Chil-
ean reality. 
A first relevant element refers to the low levels of internal democra-
cy among Chilean political parties.5 This can be observed in the selection 
of party leadership and legislative candidates. Regarding the latter, several 
                                                 
5  Strictly speaking, the following description applies up to 2015, the year in 
which Congress passed the Strengthening and Transparency of Democracy bill, 
which devised a series of measures aimed at reinforcing the internal democrati-
zation and transparency levels of political parties in return for state-sponsored 
financing. 
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scholars argue that the selection of congressional candidates has been a 
party-dominated and elite-driven process (Field and Siavelis 2011; Luna 
and Mardones 2010; Navia 2005). In fact, with a few rare exceptions, up 
to the general election of 2013, the party elites of both major coalitions 
consistently nominated legislative candidates with hardly any feedback 
from party members or activists, whether through election primaries or 
any other internal democratic decision mechanism.6 Some scholars claim 
that this lack of consultation stemmed from the complexities of the 
former binomial electoral system, which encouraged party elites to retain 
their grip on the nomination process (Navia 2008; Siavelis 2009).7  
The selection of party leadership follows a similar pattern. Accord-
ing to press information (Del Solar 2015), during the internal party lead-
ership elections between 2014 and 2015, only the PS saw more than a 
quarter of its registered members actually vote. The other large parties 
only saw between 11 percent and 17 percent of their members vote. The 
right-wing UDI, the party with the largest number of parliamentary 
members up to 2017, used registered members’ votes to elect its leader-
ship for the first time in 2016.  
A second weakness refers to the fact that party elites have been re-
luctant to renew their leadership ranks. Incumbents are normally granted 
the right of renomination or, in the worst-case scenario, are asked to 
compete in other electoral districts (Navia 2008). The Political Elites in 
Latin America (PELA) parliamentary survey provides some evidence to 
support this point. According to data published in the Bulletin number 8, 
61.4 percent of Chilean congress members between 1994 and 2006 were 
serving for at least a second legislative period; the Latin American aver-
age was only 33.4 percent.  
Third, the Chilean party system is loosely connected to society in 
the sense that parties have very few ties with civil society organizations 
(Luna and Altman 2011). As Garretón (1990) anticipated, the deep im-
brication between political parties and social organizations observed 
during the preauthoritarian period has not been reproduced in the cur-
rent era. The Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt 
2013) provides some evidence to support this point. A total of 1,397 
                                                 
6  According to Navia (2008) and Field and Siavelis (2011), some parties of the 
Coalition of Parties for Democracy, particularly the PDC, experienced prima-
ries during the 1993 and 1997 legislative elections, although these were excep-
tional. For the 2013 general election, only one of the six major parties (RN) 
elected candidates through open primaries in 10 out of 60 districts. 
7  A proportional representation system replaced the binomial system in 2013. 
The new system was employed for the first time in the 2017 general election. 
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experts from 88 countries were asked whether their countries’ main 
parties “have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil socie-
ty organizations.” The results for Chile, Latin America, and a group of 
advanced democracies are shown in figure 2(b). Although the levels of 
linkage between parties and different social organizations in Chile and 
Latin America are similar, they are remarkably lower than those observed 
in advanced democracies.  
The binomial electoral system arguably reinforced this negative as-
sessment of Chilean parties, which – according to Siavelis (2009, 2016) – 
limited the impact of voters’ preferences on electoral outcomes. With 
only two members being elected in each district, and with the rule that a 
polling coalition can obtain both seats only if it doubles the number of 
votes obtained by the second-placed list, candidates of the major coali-
tions were able to secure both legislative seats with very few exceptions. 
Consequently, the binomial system made electoral outcomes predictable, 
thus limiting competition and eroding the degree of accountability of the 
political system.  
These negative traits have led scholars to seriously doubt the com-
paratively favorable nature of Chile’s party system. Luna and Altman 
(2011) argue that although it certainly is stable, it has become uprooted 
from society. Taking into account the strong control that elites have over 
their parties and the low levels of citizen involvement, Luna and Mar-
dones (2010) claim that the political system increasingly resembles Dahl’s 
notion of a “competitive oligarchy.” Siavelis (2009) similarly describes 
the Chile’s current party system as an emerging “partyarchy” in the sense 
that political parties co-opt all relevant routes of political representation 
and policy development to the point that the political system’s accounta-
bility appears to be under threat. Although political stability has not been 
compromised, Chilean parties have systematically failed to build strong 
ties with society, promote their own legitimacy and accountability, and 
guarantee citizen involvement in their decision-making processes. In 
summarizing these arguments, we suggest that the current party system 
has become encapsulated in a double sense – that is, it has become fro-
zen at the elite level and also increasingly unattached to the rest of socie-
ty.  
In this scenario, it is hardly surprising that the reputation of political 
parties has suffered dramatically. Figure 2(c) shows the percentage of the 
adult population that mentioned trusting various political and nonpoliti-
cal institutions “a lot” or “somewhat” in a July 2014 CEP survey. What 
is surprising is not that political parties ranked lowest, as they have done 
this since the 1990s (Huneeus 2014: 434), but that only 6 percent of the 
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entire sample mentioned trusting them. An April 2015 CEP survey asked 
respondents about their perceptions of how political parties manage their 
internal affairs. One question asked whether “political parties take into 
account the views of its members when making decisions,” to which 
only 14 percent of respondents agreed. More dramatically, when asked 
whether “the decisions made by parties are transparent,” only 8 percent 
of the respondents agreed. These results are reinforced by Carlin’s (2014) 
Q-method analysis of respondents’ answers to a set of items gauging 
perceived levels of integrity, competence, and responsiveness of Chilean 
political parties. His analysis identifies three cognitive rubrics of political 
party trustworthiness – one of which refers specifically to how parties 
manage their internal affairs and power struggles. Compared to the other 
two cognitive rubrics, respondents’ scores on this rubric were the most 
highly correlated with a 4-point scale of trust in political parties. Thus, 
there is clear evidence that Chileans’ overall assessment of political par-
ties is not only negative but is also deeply tied to the way parties conduct 
their internal affairs. 
Lastly, figure 2(d) shows the evolution of another element, ideologi-
cal polarization levels of the Chilean party system between 1994 and 
2014 (estimated by Singer (2016) using data from the PELA parliamen-
tary surveys).8 As a contrast, we added the countries with the lowest 
(Costa Rica) and highest (Bolivia) levels of fluctuation in levels of polari-
zation across time. As can be seen, ideological polarization levels in the 
Chilean party system are very stable and are more similar to the patterns 
observed in Costa Rica than in Bolivia. In fact, according to Singer’s 
(2016) estimates, Chile ranks fourth among the sample of 17 Latin 
American countries as having the most stable levels of ideological polari-
zation. This result is very relevant given the importance of ideological 
convergence in explaining the processes of brand dilution and partisan 
decline observed in advanced and some Latin American democracies 
(Berglund et al. 2004; Lupu, 2014, 2015a; Levitsky, Loxton, and Van 
Dyck 2016). We will come back to this point in the final section of the 
article. 
  
                                                 
8  Ideological polarization is measured by the level of dispersion in the left–right 
position of political parties, which is captured by representatives’ responses to 
the left–right scale. 
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3 Party Identification in an Encapsulated 
System 
In his classic account Converse (1969) proposes a theoretical model 
which depicts party identification as a social habit, where the degree of 
subjective attachment with a preferred party increases with cumulative 
electoral experience (denoted as Ip), and consequently, is highly correlat-
ed with aging. He formalized this assertion in the following way:  
     	
  	, 
where Ye is the number of years a voter has been eligible to vote in elec-
tions (which is perfectly correlated with age in a stable democracy), p is 
the proportion of elections in which the voter has participated, and R is 
the resistance function that weights each year of electoral experience as 
an inverse function of the age at which an individual became eligible to 
vote9. This relatively simple but elegant parametrization requires not only 
that cumulative electoral experience take into account of the summation 
of years under which a voter is eligible to vote (Ye) but also that such 
experience should be weighted on the propensity to participate in elec-
tions (p). The key reason for this is that it is cumulative electoral experi-
ence and not experience per se that increases the chances that people will 
identify with political parties. In other words, the key mechanism is that 
as voters age and, consequently, have had the opportunity to repeatedly 
support their preferred parties, their identification with their parties 
tends to stabilize and strengthen (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Dinas 2014). 
In our empirical analysis we depart from this operationalization in favor 
of an APC approach, which we believe can overcome some important 
limitations of Converse’s (1969) proposal. We fully explain this in sec-
tion 4. 
An important feature of Converse’s (1969) model is that the posi-
tive effect of cumulative electoral experience is expected only in coun-
tries with stable and long-lived party systems. Meanwhile, in countries 
with new or young democratic regimes, citizens have not had the oppor-
tunity to accumulate electoral experience. Consequently, the relationship 
between partisanship and age is expected to be flat. This correlation can 
even be negative in countries with brief democratic experiences (10–15 
years) because younger people develop partisan identifications at higher 
                                                 
9  According to Converse (1969), R = a/(100-a) where a is the difference between 
the age of the voter and the age at which he or she became eligible to vote. 
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rates than do older individuals, who are subject to lower learning rates. 
However, this last argument assumes the existence of an entirely new 
party system devoid of any noticeable similarities with the previous party 
system. It also presumes that the political experience accumulated by 
citizens prior to the democratic breakdown does not influence their odds 
of recovering or updating their attachments following the restoration of 
democracy. 
A sizable portion of empirical research during that past few dec-
ades, conducted principally in the United States and Europe, supports 
Converse’s life-cycle hypothesis (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Barnes et al. 
1985; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Dinas 2014; Green, Palmquist, and 
Schickler 2002; Markus 1983; Tilley 2002; see Lupu 2015a for clear 
empirical support in Latin America). However, and quite unsurprisingly, 
several scholars claim that the positive association between partisan 
strength and age corresponds, in fact, to cohort or generational effects 
that stem from the characteristics of the political environment in which 
individuals grew up (Abramson 1976, 1979; Dalton 2014). What is sur-
prising about this debate is how few of these studies actually contrast 
Converse’s (1969) propositions against a cohort-based explanation in 
order to simultaneously account for the possible confounding effects of 
year of birth, current age, and period of time (for a few exceptions, see 
Dassonneville 2012; Lisi 2015; Tilly 2002). 
What can we expect for the Chilean electorate in light of these ar-
guments? First, one may believe that Converse’s (1969) life-cycle hy-
pothesis can be applied in general terms. The key element, of course, is 
the existence of a consolidated and institutionalized party system. Even 
though electoral politics had been discontinued in Chile between 1973 
and 1988, the postauthoritarian party system strongly resembled the 
system that existed before the democratic breakdown (Garretón 1993; 
Valenzuela and Scully 1997) and thereby facilitated the renewal of previ-
ous partisan feelings among the adult population.  
However, we believe that this is not the case. Converse’s (1969) 
model assumes not only the existence of a stable and consolidated party 
system but also that political parties have reasonably positive reputations 
among the electorate. In other words, it assumes that citizens positively 
value party brands. Otherwise, why should they be inclined to develop 
affective ties with parties or express public support for them? Even if 
identification with a party dramatically reduces the cognitive burden of 
dealing with political affairs (Shively 1979), it is unlikely that people will 
develop a sense of attachment to attitudinal objects that are widely asso-
ciated with negative traits. Furthermore, as Chilean voters participate 
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frequently in elections and interact more directly with political parties, 
they can more easily register negative and frustrating experiences, such as 
nomination processes repeatedly favoring the same candidates or party 
decisions being monopolized by unaccountable party elites. Personal 
experiences such as these will, presumably, strengthen negative evalua-
tions of parties and consequently increase the chances that they will 
experience a decline in identification. In summary, given the Chilean 
party system’s encapsulated nature, we expect that the more that individ-
uals cumulate experience with the Chilean parties, the less willing they 
will be, all being else equal, to express partisan preferences. In our statis-
tical analysis we cannot directly estimate the impact of voters’ negative 
experiences with parties, but the empirical implication is straightforward: 
as people cumulate more electoral experience with encapsulated parties, 
the probability they will identify with these parties decreases.  
4 APC Research Design 
From an APC perspective, two main sources of social change exist: indi-
viduals who themselves change and the changing composition of a 
population. Change among individuals can be divided into two types: 
aging effects and period effects. In the context of this article, aging ef-
fects refer to changes in partisan identification that occur during an indi-
vidual’s life course due to the accumulation of experience with the party 
system. Period effects reflect variations over time (years in our analysis) 
in levels of partisan identification among all age groups simultaneously. 
These effects synthesize the impact of macro- or system-level events, 
such as economic crises, elections, corruption scandals, and institutional 
changes (Yang and Land 2013). The second source of social change is 
captured via what is known as cohort effects. These reflect, in our con-
text, changes in the levels of partisan identification across groups of 
people who experience the same historical and social events at similar 
ages. 
Given our research objective, we believe that an APC methodologi-
cal approach has important advantages over Converse’s (1969) original 
empirical specification, which – like much of the research that has con-
tinued this line of research (see, for example, Claggett 1981, 1989; Dal-
ton and Weldon 2007; Rico 2010) – is based on individual-level survey 
data being aggregated at the cohort level. In this approach scholars calcu-
late cohorts’ average levels of partisanship and electoral experience and 
enter these variables into their statistical models. This entails canceling all 
intracohort variation with regard to levels of partisanship and electoral 
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experience and makes it impossible to simultaneously estimate aging, 
cohort, and period effects. Converse (1969) attributes all of the associa-
tion between cohort-level electoral experience and partisanship to a life 
cycle process, but the same results are equally attributable to a genera-
tional replacement process or, more broadly, to some unknown combi-
nation of aging, cohort, and period effects. In contrast, an APC analysis 
based on repeated cross-sectional, individual-level data can simultaneous-
ly differentiate between aging, period, and cohort effects and can achieve 
this while controlling for relevant cofounders, such as respondents’ lev-
els of educational attainment or political engagement (Yang and Land 
2013). 
Using individual-level data also makes unnecessary the troublesome 
calculation of the p component of Converse’s (1969) model, which is 
usually approximated (quite roughly) as the average turnout level for a 
cohort, or even a country, during the last election (see, for example, 
Dalton and Weldon 2007 or Rico 2010). This obviously requires that all 
members of a single cohort or, even worse, all citizens in a country are 
considered to have an equal propensity to vote. Chilean voting rules and 
CEP data provide us with more leverage. Instead of calculating Ip, we use 
respondent age as an indicator of cumulative experience; however, we 
restrict our analysis to people who have a high propensity to participate 
in national elections and have interacted with the country’s political par-
ties. Cumulative experience, as captured by age, thus necessarily entails 
cumulative electoral experience. We can easily identify these respondents 
for the period 1994–2012 because voting was compulsory for those 
registered in the Chilean Electoral Service during that time and because 
the CEP surveys included an appropriate registration question. As voting 
was compulsory, voters were compelled to participate in all subsequent 
elections once registered.10 For the period after 2012, when new legisla-
tion made registration automatic and voting voluntary, we identify peo-
ple with a high propensity to vote as those who participated in the latest 
(concurrent) legislative and presidential elections.11 Preliminary evidence 
                                                 
10  The relevant CEP question is as follows: “Are you registered in the electoral 
service in order to vote?” Not all registered voters actually cast votes during 
each election, although the probability of doing so was very high (Pr[Vote=1 | 
Inscription=1]=0.92) and remained relatively stable across time. In section C of 
the appendix, we provide the details of these calculations. It should be noted 
that registration rates declined from 89 percent in 1988 to 57 percent in 2009 
(Contreras and Navia 2013). During the period 1994–2012, 75 percent of CEP 
respondents were registered voters.  
11  Although questions were worded somewhat differently across surveys, the 
most frequently used question was as follows: “Did you vote in the last presi-
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confirms that voters who participated in a presidential election had a 
high propensity to vote in other elections as well. For example, accord-
ing to the November 2015 CEP survey, 86 percent of all the respondents 
who voted in the 2013 national election (67 percent) also participated in 
the 2012 municipal election. 
4.1 Variables and Data Sources 
We base our empirical analysis on data from the CEP surveys conducted 
between 1994 and 2014. These surveys use a probability multistage clus-
ter sampling design that is representative of Chilean adults aged 18 and 
older. Using all datasets that contain the required variables for our analy-
sis, we employ a total of 29 cross-sectional surveys that span 21 years.12 
The pooled data set contains information for 32,733 individuals.13  
In the CEP surveys identification with a political party was captured 
with the following question: “Of the following political parties men-
tioned in this card, with which one do you identify or sympathize more?” 
Respondents who refused to mention a single party were asked this fol-
low-up question: “Well, to which party do you feel a little closer?” (Sec-
tion B of the appendix contains the original questions in Spanish.) To 
predict whether respondents identified with parties, we simply recode 
their answers into a binary variable with a value of 1 for those who men-
tioned a political party either in the first or follow-up question and 0 
otherwise. To predict individuals’ preferred party group, we create a 
nominal variable with the following four options: (a) right-wing party 
identification for those who mentioned feeling close to RN or UDI, (b) 
center party identification for those who mentioned feeling close to the 
PDC, (c) center-left identification for respondents who mentioned feel-
                                                                                                    
dential and legislative election of (YEAR)?” In 2002 the electoral registration 
question was not asked, but participation during the 1999 presidential and legis-
lative elections was inquired about. In our sample we included respondents 
who responded affirmatively to this question. If they had voted, they were nec-
essarily registered voters during this period of time.  
12  The CEP (<www.cepchile.cl>) is an internationally recognized nonpartisan 
think tank that has been fielding public opinion surveys since 1987. We must 
constrain our analysis from 1994 onward because the party identification ques-
tion was first introduced in 1993 and because they only began covering rural 
areas in 1994. Information about response rates is available in section A of the 
appendix.  
13  After applying list-wise deletion to all missing responses in the covariates in-
cluded in the statistical models, our analysis dropped 3.6 percent of the availa-
ble cases. 
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ing close to the PS, PPD, or PRSD, and (d) no party identification for 
those who did not mention feeling close to any party.14  
The three key independent variables for the APC models are re-
spondent age, survey year (period), and birth cohort. Age is measured 
using respondents’ chronological ages. In our analysis we only include 
respondents who are younger than 85 years of age because sample sizes 
for older age groups are very small. Twenty-one time points from 1994 
to 2014 capture the period effects. With respect to birth cohorts, some 
studies distinguish between broad classes of generations that capture 
different political formative eras (Grasso 2014; Mannheim 1952). The 
problem with this strategy is that it requires theoretical assumptions 
about the definitions of critical periods of socialization. To avoid these 
kinds of modeling assumptions, we adhere to the common practice in 
demography (Mason et al. 1973; Yang and Land 2013) and construct 15 
five-year birth cohorts, ranging from the cutoff years 1924 or before to 
1990 or after. Therefore, and given the more disaggregated nature of this 
measure, our cohort indicators should capture any clustering of birth 
cohorts of more broadly defined generations. 
We include gender and years of education as control variables. Pre-
vious comparative research and local studies indicate that these variables 
correlate with both cohort membership and partisan identification 
(Dassonneville 2012; Segovia 2009).15 Lastly, we include an additive 
index of political news consumption as a proxy of political interest, 
which enables us to capture survey respondents’ subjective inclination 
toward political affairs.16  
4.2 Statistical Identification of APC Effects 
Empirically differentiating between cohort, age, and period effects con-
stitutes a challenging methodological problem and has generated much 
research (Glenn 2005; Neundorf and Niemi 2014; Yang and Land 2013). 
In recent years Yang and Land (2013) proposed estimating APC effects 
                                                 
14  For this part of the analysis, we dropped respondents who mentioned feeling 
close to small parties, such as the Communist Party, Humanist Party, and oth-
ers. These accounted for 4 percent of all responses. 
15  Years of education is measured as an ordinal variable with nine levels: 0 years, 
1–3 years, 4–7 years, 8 years, 9–11 years, 12 years, 13–16 years, 17 years, and 18 
years or more. 
16  The survey question was as follows: “For each activity that I mention, can you 
tell me if you do it frequently, sometimes, or never: (a) Watch political news on 
television?; (b) Read news about politics?” Both items share a polychoric corre-
lation of 0.76.  
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using hierarchical cross-classified models. This approach, which is par-
ticularly useful for analyzing repeated cross-sectional survey data, simul-
taneously captures cohort and period effects as random effect variables 
and the influence of age through a fixed-effect coefficient. 
Despite its flexibility, the cross-classified multilevel model has a sig-
nificant weakness. To identify APC effects, it is necessary to assume that 
the random effects of cohorts and periods are uncorrelated with individ-
ual-level predictors. Therefore, unless the cohort effects deviate strongly 
from linearity, age and cohort random effects will be strongly correlated, 
which can lead to biased estimates (Wooldridge 2010).  
Given this problem, we alter the specification that Yang and Land 
(2008; 2013) suggested and employ a simpler hierarchical random inter-
cept model where both age and cohorts are included as fixed effects. 
This allows us to avoid the independence assumption between cohort 
random effects and age. We also decompose period effects into a linear 
time-trend covariate, which is included as a fixed effect in the model, and 
a residual random effect variable that captures the yearly deviations of 
the linear time trend variable. Therefore, the basic model is as follows: 
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 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where  is :;-
  	, and 
 is the dependent variable for indi-
vidual i from cohort j in period k and indicates whether the respondent 
identifies with a political party. The  coefficients are parameters to be 
estimated for age, survey year, gender, education, and political interest. 
Similarly, the J  coefficients are also parameters to be estimated and 
reflect the difference between the reference cohort category (respond-
ents born in 1924 or before) and each of the following younger cohorts. 
The period residual random effect 9-is assumed to be normally distrib-
uted <9=>?@ AB'	C. We complement this model with a second specifi-
cation that incorporates a quadratic age term, which allows the effect of 
cumulative influence of electoral experience to decline as individuals 
grow older. All statistical models employ a logistic link function and are 
estimated by maximum likelihood. To facilitate convergence of the mod-
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els, age, age squared, and year are centered on their minimum observed 
values.17  
To test whether the influence of cumulative electoral experience is 
similar across the different political parties, we use a Bayesian multino-
mial logistic hierarchical model for equation 1, which allows us to predict 
identification with political parties grouped according to their ideological 
positions.18 The model has a very similar specification to equation 1, save 
for one difference. Taking into account the aggregate trends of the right-
wing and left-wing party groups observed in figure 1(b), we modeled the 
time trend of the period effect component by using two linear spline 
variables. The first spline corresponds to the year of the survey (centered 
on its minimum value – namely, 1994), while the second spline corre-
sponds to 0 for all years between 1994 and 2004 and enumerates the 
number of years since 2005 (which is the year from which aggregate 
identification with these parties started to decline). Accordingly, the 
second spline coefficient captures how much the influence of the years 
2005–2014 changes with respect to the period 1994–2004. 
5 Empirical Results 
Results from the random intercept logit models predicting partisanship 
are shown in table 1. The second column of the table contains the esti-
mates of the random effects model with a linear age specification. The 
third column shows the results with the added quadratic age term. 
The estimates from both models reveal a negative relationship be-
tween age and party identification, while controlling for birth cohort and 
survey period. Model 1 indicates a statistically significant (p<0.01) nega-
tive linear relationship whereby a 10-year increase in cumulative experi-
ence leads, on average, to a 19 percent reduction (DE'F=0.81) in the 
odds of mentioning a political party. Model 2 indicates that the negative 
effect of age tends to become smaller as respondents accumulate more 
                                                 
17  Respondent age was also divided by 10 to facilitate convergence. While analyz-
ing the data, we noticed that the APC estimates, particularly those of cohorts, 
were sensitive to the cutoff year used to define the oldest five-year birth co-
horts. Consequently, we estimated different model specifications that varied the 
cohort-coding scheme. In the article we present the results from the model that 
best fit the data. Full details about this procedure and the results from different 
specifications are available in section D of the appendix. 
18  The estimation of this model employed MCMC techniques. Section E of the 
appendix contains all relevant details about estimation and convergence diag-
nostics. 
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experience, evidenced by the statistically significant positive coefficient 
of the quadratic term.  
Table 1. Hierarchical Logit APC Models for Party Identification 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  0.513 (0.456)  0.557 (0.456) 
Age -0.217 (0.080)*** -0.351 (0.095)*** 
Age2   0.021 (0.008)*** 
Cohort 1925–1929 -0.069 (0.108) -0.024 (0.109) 
Cohort 1930–1934 -0.209 (0.127)* -0.135 (0.129) 
Cohort 1935–1939 -0.278 (0.158)* -0.169 (0.163) 
Cohort 1940–1944 -0.356 (0.192)* -0.224 (0.198) 
Cohort 1945–1949 -0.370 (0.228) -0.219 (0.235) 
Cohort 1950–1954 -0.420 (0.266) -0.262 (0.272) 
Cohort 1955–1959 -0.645 (0.304)** -0.491 (0.309) 
Cohort 1960–1964 -0.730 (0.342)** -0.589 (0.346)* 
Cohort 1965–1969 -0.737 (0.381)* -0.619 (0.384) 
Cohort 1970–1974 -0.804 (0.420)* -0.717 (0.421)* 
Cohort 1975–1979 -0.911 (0.460)** -0.853 (0.460)* 
Cohort 1980–1984 -0.868 (0.502)* -0.832 (0.502)* 
Cohort 1985–1989 -0.883 (0.545) -0.874 (0.545) 
Cohort 1990 or after -1.041 (0.600)* -1.068 (0.600)* 
Year -0.058 (0.011)*** -0.057 (0.011)*** 
Political interest  0.983 (0.022)***  0.984 (0.022)*** 
Education  -0.031 (0.008)*** -0.031 (0.008)*** 
Gender (women=1) -0.096 (0.025)*** -0.096 (0.025)*** 
Period μ  0.20  0.20 
   
AIC 39821.578 39816.641 
Deviance 39705.688 39698.685 
N obs 31536 31536 
N periods       21       21 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
To convey a more intuitive sense of these results and those of the other 
key variables, in figure 3 we illustrate the predicted probabilities of iden-
tifying with a party by age, cohort, and period. These predicted probabili-
ties are calculated using model 2 from table 1 and following the observed 
values approach (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013).19 As can be seen in 
figure 1(a), the probability of identifying with a political party decreases 
as voters become older, although a slightly curvilinear pattern indicates 
that the effect of each additional year becomes marginally smaller. The 
                                                 
19  To obtain confidence bands of the predicted values, we drew samples from the 
posterior distribution of the coefficients and random effects. Full details about 
this procedure are available in section F of the appendix.  
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expected difference in identification levels between 85-year-old and 18-
year-old respondents corresponds to 0.31 points on the probability scale. 
This confirms that Chilean voters tend to abandon their party identifica-
tion the more they have been exposed to the party system. These results 
contradict Converse’s (1969) social-learning hypothesis but nicely con-
firm our own hypothesis: the accumulation of electoral experience con-
tributes to increasing levels of partisan detachment in Chile. 
In table 1 we can also see that negative cohort effects increase in 
size as respondents were born more recently. Only a few birth cohorts 
contain marginally significant coefficients, but the overall effect of birth 
cohorts is relevant. We carried out a likelihood ratio test that contrasts 
model 2 with a nested model that drops all birth cohorts; it indicates a 
significant overall effect (G'  HIEJK /L  IK -  ?E?I). The predicted 
probabilities of birth cohorts are also shown in figure 3(b). Although all 
cohorts born before 1955 show very similar levels of partisanship, those 
born thereafter progressively become less partisan. These point estimates 
contain a large degree of uncertainly (they account for variation in both 
the coefficients and the random effects), but the differences are sizable. 
While the probability of identifying with a party is 0.69 for the 1950–
1954 birth cohort, this decreases almost linearly to 0.52 for those born in 
1990 or after. This result is important because it confirms that the de-
cline in mass partisanship occurs not only through individual-level 
change but also through societal-level change, where younger and less 
partisan cohorts slowly replace older and more partisan cohorts.  
Figure 3. Estimated Probability of Identifying with a Political Party by Age, 
Cohort, and Period 
 
 
As mentioned in section 4, period effects are decomposed into a linear 
trend component, which is captured through the coefficient of the year 
variable, and residual random effects, which are captured – in turn – via 
the variance parameter AB . The coefficient of year is not only highly 
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significant (p<0.01) but also large. However, having captured the linear 
time trend, the variance component of 0.20 shows that an important 
amount of residual variation remains. The predicted probabilities of both 
of these elements are shown in figure 3(c). The straight line represents 
the linear time trend, whereas the points indicate the yearly deviations 
from the trend (with their associated confidence bands). The time trend 
reveals a large decrease in partisanship among all age groups as time has 
passed: from an average probability of identification of 0.64 in 1994 to 
0.39 in 2014. At first glance, it appears that the residual random effects 
tend to oscillate aimlessly; however, there is in fact a clear cyclical pattern 
related to presidential election years.  
Table 2.  Multinomial Hierarchical Logit APC Model for Identification with 
Mainstream Parties 
 PS/PPD/PRS
D versus None 
DC versus 
None 
RN versus 
None 
Intercept -1.192 (0.781) -0.729 (0.767) -1.804 (0.760)** 
Age -0.586 (0.152)*** -0.238 (0.153) -0.534 (0.153)*** 
Age2  0.038 (0.012)***  0.011 (0.013)  0.049 (0.013)*** 
Cohort 1925–1929 -0.150 (0.177)  0.065 (0.162)  0.104 (0.173) 
Cohort 1930–1934 -0.218 (0.208)  0.009 (0.199) -0.065 (0.210) 
Cohort 1935–1939 -0.346 (0.264)  0.051 (0.251) -0.094 (0.258) 
Cohort 1940–1944 -0.395 (0.317) -0.047 (0.309) -0.081 (0.314) 
Cohort 1945–1949 -0.393 (0.373)  0.058 (0.366) -0.154 (0.370) 
Cohort 1950–1954 -0.437 (0.435) -0.035 (0.426) -0.128 (0.423) 
Cohort 1955–1959 -0.687 (0.499) -0.307 (0.484) -0.418 (0.484) 
Cohort 1960–1964 -0.735 (0.555) -0.427 (0.543) -0.566 (0.542) 
Cohort 1965–1969 -0.895 (0.615) -0.409 (0.602) -0.613 (0.601) 
Cohort 1970–1974 -1.052 (0.678) -0.452 (0.663) -0.758 (0.662) 
Cohort 1975–1979 -1.245 (0.737)* -0.768 (0.726) -0.868 (0.722) 
Cohort 1980–1984 -1.348 (0.807)* -1.008 (0.799) -0.784 (0.783) 
Cohort 1985–1989 -1.409 (0.873) -1.409 (0.891) -0.977 (0.852) 
Cohort 1990–1996 -1.748 (0.955)* -1.312 (0.992) -1.129 (0.937) 
Year 1 (Spline)  0.004 (0.039) -0.124 (0.039)***  0.035 (0.039) 
Year 2 (Spline) -0.087 (0.075)  0.030 (0.077) -0.154 (0.076)** 
Education -0.042 (0.012)*** -0.141 (0.012)***  0.076 (0.013)*** 
Gender (women=1) -0.226 (0.038)*** -0.064 (0.040)  0.057 (0.038) 
Political interest  1.269 (0.033)***  0.866 (0.035)***  1.015 (0.034)*** 
Period μ   0.518  0.517  0.508 
    
Deviance  60980.114  
N obs  30245  
N periods        21  
Note:  Coefficients are posterior means from posterior distribution of parameters. 
Standard errors correspond to standard deviation of posterior distributions.  
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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Indeed, the positive hikes of 1994, 1999, 2005, and 2009 all occurred 
either during a presidential election year or the year after (as in the case 
of 1994, though the election was held in December 1993). This result 
shows that electoral cycles may have a positive influence on partisan 
identification in the short run; though this pattern decreases in the long 
run. Moreover, if one compares the largest boost to partisanship (2005) 
with the next ones occurring in 2009 and 2014, it seems that the short-
term increases become progressively smaller. 
Table 2 illustrates the estimates of the multinomial logit random in-
tercept model predicting identification with parties grouped by their 
ideological orientation. This model yields three particularly important 
results. First, both the linear and squared age coefficients have the same 
signs for all party groups, although the magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance of the coefficients vary. While the linear and quadratic coefficients 
are highly significant in predicting identification with right-wing and 
center-left parties (p<0.01), they are not significant in terms of predicting 
identification with the PDC. These trends are illustrated in the probabil-
ity scale in figure 4. The decline in identification associated with aging is 
most pronounced for center-left parties, followed by right-wing parties; 
it is least pronounced for the PDC. There is a decline of 21 percentage 
points in the probability of identifying with left-wing parties across the 
entire age range. The respective decline in identification with right-wing 
parties indicates a more curvilinear pattern: the probability of identifica-
tion decreases from 0.22 among 18-year-old voters to 0.12 among 65 
year olds and then increases two points among 85 year olds.  
In terms of identification with the PDC, there is a difference of only 
four percentage points between those with the highest propensity (35 
year olds; 0.16) and the lowest propensity (85 year olds; 0.12). It is im-
portant to note that although these differences may not seem particularly 
large, they are in fact at odds with Converse’s (1969) prediction of a 
positive trend. The cumulative decline in levels of identification adds up 
to a sizable increase in the probability of not identifying with any of the 
mainstream parties: from 0.32 among 18 year olds to 0.65 among 85 year 
olds. All of this implies that cumulative electoral experience, as captured 
with the aging coefficient in our APC analysis, applies to all of the major 
Chilean political parties – though the magnitude of this effect varies 
across party groups. 
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Figure 4. Estimated Probability of Identifying with Mainstream Political 
Parties by Age 
 
 
A second key result concerns period effects. Given that year spline vari-
ables cannot be easily interpreted, we focus on the predicted probabilities 
shown in figure 5. These show that the probability of identification with 
the PDC decreased strongly (from 0.31 to 0.06) for all age groups be-
tween 1994 and 2014. In contrast, identification with right-wing and 
center-left parties was less affected by period effects. In fact, between 
1994 and 2005, identification with right-wing and center-left parties 
increased eight and four percentage points, respectively, and then de-
clined nine and five percentage points, respectively, up to 2014. There-
fore, the overall decline in party identification attributable to period 
effects is due, to a significant degree, to the decline in identification with 
the PDC in particular among all age groups. Right-wing and center-left 
party identification has rather been more prone, comparatively speaking, 
to aging effects. 
Figure 5. Estimated Probability of Identifying with Mainstream Political 
Parties by Year of Survey 
 
 
These results are not only consistent with Navia and Osorio’s (2014), 
they also extend them. Just as Navia and Osorio (2014) show, the decline 
in PDC support was the sharpest among all Chilean parties; though its 
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erosion occurred principally through period effects. In contrast, the 
decline in identification with left-wing and right-wing parties occurred to 
a greater extent through cumulative experience, as captured by the aging 
coefficients. In other words, all Chilean parties have experienced less 
support over time, but the relative weight of each source of change has 
been different. 
Finally, cohort effects tend to be similar across party groups. They 
all indicate that more recently born voters have become progressively 
less partisan. Some differences exist in the magnitude of the coefficients, 
with center-left parties showing the most negative trend; however, these 
differences appear to be smaller than those observed for aging effects 
and especially period effects. 
6 Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper we used an APC analysis to examine partisan identification 
with the aim of better understanding its sharp decline in Chilean society 
during the past two decades. We found that all three sources of social 
change had negative effects, but there are some important nuances be-
tween the different political parties. First, period effects stand out as 
having dramatically lowered mass-level partisanship for all voter age 
groups. Our decomposition of these effects demonstrates that partisan-
ship has been responsive in the short term to electoral cycles, which 
implies that elections tend to produce a boom-and-bust pattern, but has 
also clearly experienced a long-term linear decline. Disaggregating this 
trend by party group, we observed that a sizable portion of the decline 
from 1994 to 2005 occurred among supporters of the PDC, whereas 
right-wing and center-left parties slightly increased their levels of support 
during this period. In contrast, after 2005, support decreased for all 
mainstream Chilean parties among all age groups.  
Second, we found negative cohort effects, which indicate a certain 
discontinuity among the population born before and after the birth co-
hort of 1950–1954. Although partisanship remained relatively stable 
among those born prior to 1950–1954, net of period and aging affects, 
subsequent cohorts revealed progressively lower levels. Third, and most 
theoretically relevant, we found that as respondents’ age, and conse-
quently cumulate more electoral experience, their probability of identify-
ing with a party decreases – a result that openly contradicts Converse’s 
(1969) classic social-learning model. Our results also demonstrate some 
important differences between party groups. For instance, the age-related 
decline in partisanship is most pronounced for center-left parties, fol-
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lowed by right-wing parties, and then the PDC. However, identification 
with party groups decreases with aging in all cases.  
These results imply that all three sources of social change are con-
sistently and rapidly leading toward the extinction of mass-level partisan-
ship in Chilean society. Given that several authors believe mass partisan-
ship has a positive influence over political engagement and system stabil-
ity (Campell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Watten-
berg 1998), the potential consequences of these trends are worrisome. 
The decline in partisanship might be behind, at least in part, the dramatic 
drop in electoral participation that occurred during the same period (see 
Contreras and Navia 2013 for a full description of this trend) and the rise 
of strong independent presidential candidates during the 2009 and 2013 
presidential elections. Likewise, the disastrous electoral performance of 
the PDC and PPD in the 2017 congressional elections (each party lost 
around a third and half of its elected representatives in the lower Cham-
ber) seems consistent with Lupu’s (2014) assertion that party break-
downs are anteceded by clear processes of eroding party support. It 
remains to be seen whether or not these turbulent times will persist for 
the established parties in the coming years.  
Conceptually, we believe that the negative aging effects we uncov-
ered should be considered very carefully. While they are clearly at odds 
with Converse’s (1969) hypothesis about the role of an enduring and 
stable party system, they also confirm his more general claim that the 
association between aging and partisanship depends critically on a party 
system’s configuration. In light of the Chilean experience, our findings 
appear to indicate that a stable and long-lived party system is necessary 
but not sufficient to secure rising levels of mass partisanship. The Chile-
an experience seems to suggest that when political parties adopt an en-
capsulated configuration, the result can be a massive attitudinal defection 
from parties – which we believe is indicated by long-term negative peri-
od and aging effects. 
Although it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate this connec-
tion with a case-study like ours, it is important to note that one of the 
contextual variables most commonly used to explain processes of parti-
san decline – namely, decreasing levels of ideological polarization (Berg-
lund et al. 2004; Lupu 2015b) – is unlikely to be relevant in the Chilean 
case because the levels of ideological polarization have remained remark-
ably stable in the country (see section 2). Consequently, one of Lupu’s 
(2014) key mechanisms for explaining processes of party decline and 
breakdown in Argentina and Venezuela is not likely to apply in Chile. Of 
course, our interpretation of the configuration of the Chilean party sys-
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tem does not contradict the relevance of ideological polarization; rather, 
it suggests that there is another potential theoretical mechanism that 
causes partisan identification levels to decline sharply in both new and 
old democracies. 
Our research findings also call for further comparative research not 
only on how the institutional settings or general attributes of party sys-
tems influence the development of long-term partisan orientations but 
also on how specific features of the internal workings of political parties 
might promote party identification. Factors such as internal democracy 
levels, linkages to social organizations, and reelection rates of representa-
tives might influence both people’s willingness to identify with parties 
and whether their identification will endure in the long term.  
Finally, it is important to point out that this article focuses on how 
certain conditions promote negative experiences with parties. Conse-
quently, we only tested the empirical implications of this explanatory 
mechanism. Thus, future research based on panel or experimental data 
could provide a more direct assessment. 
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Identificación partidaria en un sistema de partidos encapsulado: el 
caso del Chile post autoritario 
Resumen: Desde el retorno de la democracia, la identificación con par-
tidos políticos ha disminuido drásticamente entre el público chileno. 
Buscamos comprender este proceso por medio de un análisis de edad-
período-cohorte aplicado a datos de encuesta de entre 1994 y 2014. A la 
luz del carácter elitista y socialmente desenraizado, o lo que llamamos la 
naturaleza encapsulada, del sistema de partidos chileno, hipotetizamos 
que la experiencia electoral acumulada ha tenido un efecto negativo so-
bre la identificación con partidos, y no uno positivo tal como lo predeci-
ría el modelo de aprendizaje social de Converse (1969). Nuestros hallaz-
gos respaldan estas expectativas, pero también revelan efectos período de 
gran magnitud que han reducido el nivel agregado de identificación par-
tidaria y, además, importantes efectos cohorte donde las generaciones 
nacidas después de 1950 se han vuelto cada vez menos partidistas. Tam-
bién descubrimos importantes matices en estos patrones entre los distin-
tos partidos políticos del país. Concluimos que las tres fuentes de cambio 
social están llevado a la extinción de la identificación partidaria de la 
sociedad chilena. 
Palabras clave: Chile, identificación partidaria, modelos de edad-
período-cohorte, declive partidista 
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Appendix 
Party Identification in an Encapsulated Party 
System: The Case of Postauthoritarian Chile 
The following appendix contains further details about measurement, 
survey data, and the statistical analysis carried out in this article. Section 
A provides information about response rates of CEP surveys; section B 
details the survey items employed to measure partisanship and political 
interest in Spanish; section C provides details about the association be-
tween voting in presidential/legislative elections and electoral registration 
in Chile during the period between 1997 and 2012; section D reports all 
relevant information about model selection; section E provides all rele-
vant details about the estimation of the multinomial hierarchical logit 
model; and section F describes how confidence bands of Figure 3 
through 5 were calculated.  
A  CEP Surveys Response Rates  
Response rates of CEP surveys are not available for the full time period 
covered by our analysis. We do have explicit information from 2010 
onwards, during which time response rates (type RR1 according to AA-
POR guidelines) ranged between 72 and 84 percent. For the period be-
tween 1994 and 2009, CEP surveys used replacements during fieldwork 
whenever interviewers could not enter into the square block, could not 
make contact with a household member, or the household member re-
jected participating in the surveys. Selection of a new household was 
done according to specific protocols. During this period, on average, 17 
percent of the total number of achieved interviews were from a house-
hold selected by replacement (minimum=10%, maximum=35%).  
B  CEP Survey Items  
Partisanship: 
 Main question: “De los siguientes partidos políticos que se presen-
tan en esta tarjeta, ¿con cuál de ellos se identifica ms o simpatiza ms 
Ud.?” 
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 Follow up question applied to those who did not mention a party in 
the previous question: “Bien, ?y de cuál partido se siente un poco 
más cercano?”. 
Political Interest: 
 “Para cada actividad que le nombraré indique si Ud. la realiza fre-
cuentemente, a veces, o nunca. Mira programas políticos en televi-
sion?” 
 “Para cada actividad que le nombraré indique si Ud. la realiza fre-
cuentemente, a veces, o nunca. Lee noticias sobre política?” 
C  Relationship between Electoral Registra-
tion and Turnout 
As mentioned in footnote 10 of the article, the probability that a re-
spondent who mentioned to be registered voter actually cast a vote dur-
ing the last presidential or legislative election is very high. This is an 
important result given that the mechanism postulated by Converse that 
actually increases individuals’ propensity to identify with a party is not 
age per se, but the accumulation of electoral experience. Consequently, 
we seek to restrict our APC analysis to respondents who have a high 
propensity to regularly vote in elections. Table A provides the parameter 
estimates of a three binary logit model predicting whether a respondent 
cast a vote by her registration status. Models are estimated using 17 CEP 
cross sectional surveys applied between the years 1997 and 2012, though 
some years in-between are missing given unavailability either of the 
turnout or electoral registration question (these correspond to 1998, 
1999, 2004, and 2009). The first model captures the bivariate relationship 
between these variables, while the second model adds year as a control 
variable, and the third adds an interaction to test the possibility that the 
compulsory effect of being registered decayed in time. According to 
model 1 the predicted probability that a registered voter participated in 
the last election equals 0.92. In contrast the probability that a non-
registered voter cast a vote equals 0.006 (they are 16 respondents who 
mentioned to vote but were not registered).  
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Table A. Logit Models for Participation in Legislative and Presidential Elec-
tions by Voter Registration and Year, 1994-2012 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -5.062*** -4.850*** -5.253*** 
 (0.251) (0.259) (0.783) 
Registered 7.487*** 7.533*** 7.940*** 
 (0.252) (0.253) (0.788) 
Year  -0.020*** 0.017 
  (0.006) (0.066) 
Registered x Year   -0.037 
   (0.066) 
AIC 11302.106 11294.133 11295.824 
BIC 11318.125 11318.162 11327.862 
Log Likelihood -5649.053 -5644.067 -5643.912 
Deviance 11298.106 11288.133 11287.824 
Num. obs. 22236 22236 22236 
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Consistent with official registration records, model 2 shows a negative 
and significant year effect, whereby the probability that Chilean respond-
ents participated in elections declined with time. Model 3 shows that this 
decline occurred fundamentally through the reduction in the proportion 
of people who registered to vote given that the rate at which registered 
voters actually voted did not decline in time, as indicated by the nonsig-
nificant interaction between registration status and survey year. There-
fore, we conclude that once people were registered, their propensity to 
continue voting, on average, remained very high during the entire period 
between 1994 and 2012.  
D  Model Selection and Cohort Coding 
Scheme  
As mentioned in the article (see footnote 18). the APC estimates, par-
ticularly those of cohorts, are sensitive to the cut-off year used to define 
the oldest birth cohort (which is employed as the reference category). 
The variability contained in these estimates opens the possibility of se-
lecting arbitrarily which results to present in the article. To avoid this 
possibility, we devised a simple model selection procedure with the aim 
of finding the coding scheme of the cohort dummy variables that obtains 
the best fit to the data, as measured by the deviance (-2 x log Likelihood) 
and the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). The procedure consisted in 
estimating ten logit models, as specified in equation 1 of the article, that 
varied sequentially the cut-off year that determined the oldest cohort. 
  The Case of Postauthoritarian Chile 63
 

 
The first model defined the oldest cohort as those born in 1917 or be-
fore, while the next one used those born in 1918 or before, and so on, 
until the year 1926. We performed this exercise for both models with a 
linear and quadratic specification of age. All statistical models were esti-
mated via Maximum Likelihood with using a 7 point per axis adaptive 
Gauss-Hermite approximation to the log-likelihood. The results are 
shown in Table B and C. Our main conclusions are the following: 
The deviance and AIC statistics of the models predicting party iden-
tification, both with a linear or quadratic age specification, indicate that 
models 3 and 8 obtain, overall, the best fit. This coincidence is an ex-
pected result given that model 8 employs basically the same coding 
scheme of cohorts than model 3 with the exception that it merges into a 
single group the two oldest cohorts from model 3 (those born in 1919 or 
before and born between 1920 and 1924). Model 8 also collapses those 
born in 1995 with the 1990-1994 cohort, given that only 2 respondents 
were born during this year.  
Considering the model deviance, model 3 obtains a marginally bet-
ter fit than model 8 among all estimated specifications (both with a linear 
and quadratic age specification). However, notice that both models re-
cover very similar parameter estimates in both Table B and C.  
In contrast, when models are evaluated considering the Akaike In-
formation Criteria (AIC), model 8 is favored. Compared to model devi-
ance this criteria slightly penalizes for model complexity, which seems 
quite appropriate in our scenario.  
When comparing across specifications, the model with a quadratic 
age term is clearly favored over the linear age specification, with a five-
point difference in the AIC statistic.  
Accordingly, the parameter estimates shown in this article corre-
spond to the parameter estimated of model 8, that is, the model that 
defines the oldest cohort as those born in 1924 or before. 
Table B. Maximum Likelihood Hierarchical APC Logit Models for Party 
Identification with Linear Age 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -1.099** -0.155 0.471 -0.940* -0.674 
 (0.545) (0.532) (0.519) (0.508) (0.495) 
Age (scaled) 0.046 -0.119 -0.228*** 0.013 -0.025 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) 
Cohort 2 0.002 -0.017 -0.068 0.085 0.035 
 (0.195) (0.172) (0.154) (0.141) (0.131) 
Cohort 3 0.159 -0.003 -0.123 0.129 0.010 
 (0.197) (0.178) (0.163) (0.153) (0.143) 
Cohort 4 0.064 -0.073 -0.268 0.106 0.017 
 (0.214) (0.197) (0.185) (0.177) (0.170) 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Cohort 5 0.151 -0.181 -0.343 0.160 0.039 
 (0.241) (0.227) (0.217) (0.211) (0.204) 
Cohort 6 0.237 -0.128 -0.427* 0.206 0.081 
 (0.272) (0.260) (0.251) (0.246) (0.240) 
Cohort 7 0.297 -0.172 -0.447 0.285 0.119 
 (0.305) (0.295) (0.287) (0.283) (0.278) 
Cohort 8 0.385 -0.137 -0.502 0.341 0.121 
 (0.342) (0.333) (0.326) (0.322) (0.317) 
Cohort 9 0.393 -0.239 -0.734** 0.246 0.079 
 (0.379) (0.371) (0.365) (0.361) (0.356) 
Cohort 10 0.390 -0.344 -0.824** 0.286 0.064 
 (0.418) (0.410) (0.404) (0.400) (0.396) 
Cohort 11 0.442 -0.304 -0.837* 0.400 0.163 
 (0.456) (0.450) (0.444) (0.441) (0.436) 
Cohort 12 0.569 -0.323 -0.910* 0.416 0.159 
 (0.495) (0.490) (0.485) (0.482) (0.476) 
Cohort 13 0.531 -0.383 -1.023* 0.468 0.213 
 (0.534) (0.530) (0.526) (0.524) (0.519) 
Cohort 14 0.735 -0.250 -0.986* 0.607 0.329 
 (0.578) (0.574) (0.569) (0.567) (0.563) 
Cohort 15 0.832 -0.283 -1.006 0.649 0.412 
 (0.623) (0.618) (0.613) (0.612) (0.608) 
Cohort 16 0.946 -0.271 -1.170* 0.894 0.706 
 (0.671) (0.667) (0.668) (0.678) (0.697) 
Year -0.084*** -0.067*** -0.056*** -0.081*** -0.077*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Education -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Female -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Political 
Interest 
0.984*** 0.983*** 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.983*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Period μ 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201 
Deviance 39784.335 39784.445 39779.384 39784.841 39788.267 
AIC 39828.335 39828.445 39823.384 39828.841 39832.267 
N obs 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 
N periods 21 21 21 21 21 
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Intercept -1.108** -0.180 0.361 -0.788* -0.609 
 (0.483) (0.469) (0.455) (0.441) (0.429) 
Age (scaled) 0.047 -0.116 -0.216*** -0.005 -0.033 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.080) (0.079) (0.077) 
Cohort 2 0.159 0.011 -0.069 0.061 -0.017 
 (0.122) (0.114) (0.108) (0.103) (0.099) 
Cohort 3 0.065 -0.058 -0.209* 0.029 -0.014 
 (0.136) (0.131) (0.127) (0.124) (0.123) 
Cohort 4 0.153 -0.164 -0.277* 0.074 0.004 
 (0.166) (0.162) (0.158) (0.155) (0.154) 
Cohort 5 0.239 -0.111 -0.356* 0.111 0.042 
 (0.200) (0.196) (0.192) (0.189) (0.187) 
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 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Cohort 6 0.300 -0.154 -0.369 0.182 0.075 
 (0.236) (0.232) (0.228) (0.225) (0.223) 
Cohort 7 0.390 -0.117 -0.419 0.229 0.073 
 (0.274) (0.270) (0.266) (0.262) (0.260) 
Cohort 8 0.398 -0.218 -0.645** 0.125 0.027 
 (0.313) (0.309) (0.304) (0.299) (0.297) 
Cohort 9 0.396 -0.322 -0.729** 0.156 0.008 
 (0.353) (0.348) (0.342) (0.337) (0.333) 
Cohort 10 0.449 -0.280 -0.737* 0.260 0.103 
 (0.392) (0.387) (0.381) (0.375) (0.371) 
Cohort 11 0.578 -0.298 -0.804* 0.268 0.095 
 (0.431) (0.426) (0.420) (0.414) (0.408) 
Cohort 12 0.541 -0.358 -0.910** 0.310 0.144 
 (0.470) (0.466) (0.460) (0.454) (0.449) 
Cohort 13 0.745 -0.223 -0.868* 0.441 0.256 
 (0.515) (0.510) (0.502) (0.495) (0.491) 
Cohort 14 0.844 -0.255 -0.882 0.474 0.335 
 (0.561) (0.553) (0.545) (0.538) (0.533) 
Cohort 15 0.944 -0.242 -1.040* 0.711 0.625 
 (0.607) (0.603) (0.600) (0.606) (0.626) 
Cohort 16 1.060     
 (0.725)     
Year -0.084*** -0.068*** -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.076*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Education -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Female -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Political 
Interest 
0.984*** 0.983*** 0.983*** 0.984*** 0.983*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Period μ 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201 
Deviance 39784.251 39784.455 39779.578 39785.203 39788.337 
AIC 39828.251 39826.455 39821.578 39827.203 39830.337 
N obs 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 
N periods 21 21 21 21 21 
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Table C. Maximum Likelihood Hierarchical APC Logit Models for Party 
Identification with Quadratic Age 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -1.129** -0.163 0.458 -0.945* -0.668 
 (0.545) (0.532) (0.519) (0.508) (0.495) 
Age (scaled) -0.093 -0.230** -0.356*** -0.108 -0.129 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) 
Age2 (scaled) 0.022*** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.019** 0.017** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Cohort 2 0.041 0.011 -0.032 0.121 0.066 
 (0.195) (0.172) (0.154) (0.142) (0.132) 
Cohort 3 0.235 0.058 -0.050 0.198 0.069 
 (0.199) (0.179) (0.165) (0.155) (0.145) 
Cohort 4 0.176 0.012 -0.164 0.208 0.105 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 (0.217) (0.201) (0.189) (0.182) (0.175) 
Cohort 5 0.305 -0.061 -0.201 0.295 0.151 
 (0.247) (0.233) (0.223) (0.218) (0.211) 
Cohort 6 0.423 0.015 -0.259 0.365 0.213 
 (0.280) (0.267) (0.259) (0.254) (0.248) 
Cohort 7 0.509 -0.010 -0.257 0.462 0.264 
 (0.314) (0.303) (0.296) (0.292) (0.286) 
Cohort 8 0.614* 0.035 -0.303 0.526 0.270 
 (0.351) (0.341) (0.334) (0.330) (0.325) 
Cohort 9 0.626 -0.066 -0.534 0.428 0.224 
 (0.388) (0.379) (0.372) (0.368) (0.363) 
Cohort 10 0.616 -0.179 -0.635 0.456 0.196 
 (0.425) (0.416) (0.410) (0.406) (0.400) 
Cohort 11 0.651 -0.154 -0.667 0.550 0.277 
 (0.462) (0.455) (0.449) (0.445) (0.439) 
Cohort 12 0.753 -0.196 -0.768 0.539 0.248 
 (0.499) (0.493) (0.488) (0.484) (0.478) 
Cohort 13 0.685 -0.280 -0.907* 0.566 0.283 
 (0.536) (0.532) (0.527) (0.526) (0.520) 
Cohort 14 0.862 -0.168 -0.888 0.688 0.381 
 (0.580) (0.575) (0.570) (0.568) (0.564) 
Cohort 15 0.938 -0.219 -0.933 0.704 0.443 
 (0.624) (0.619) (0.614) (0.612) (0.608) 
Cohort 16 1.021 -0.232 -1.129* 0.918 0.707 
 (0.672) (0.668) (0.668) (0.678) (0.697) 
Year -0.084*** -0.067*** -0.056*** -0.081*** -0.077*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Education -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Female -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Political 
Interest 
0.985*** 0.984*** 0.984*** 0.985*** 0.984*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Period μ 0.202 0.202 0.201 0.201 0.202 
Deviance 39776.258 39779.313 39772.596 39778.721 39783.870 
AIC 39822.258 39825.313 39818.596 39824.721 39829.870 
N obs 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 
N periods 21 21 21 21 21 
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Intercept -1.083** -0.147 0.406 -0.732* -0.546 
 (0.483) (0.470) (0.455) (0.441) (0.430) 
Age (scaled) -0.094 -0.232** -0.351*** -0.129 -0.142 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) 
Age2 (scaled) 0.022*** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.019** 0.016** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Cohort 2 0.203* 0.049 -0.024 0.100 0.016 
 (0.123) (0.115) (0.109) (0.104) (0.100) 
Cohort 3 0.143 0.003 -0.135 0.097 0.044 
 (0.139) (0.134) (0.129) (0.127) (0.126) 
Cohort 4 0.270 -0.072 -0.169 0.170 0.082 
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 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 (0.171) (0.167) (0.163) (0.160) (0.159) 
Cohort 5 0.386* 0.004 -0.224 0.226 0.136 
 (0.206) (0.202) (0.198) (0.195) (0.193) 
Cohort 6 0.470* -0.022 -0.220 0.310 0.178 
 (0.243) (0.239) (0.235) (0.231) (0.229) 
Cohort 7 0.574** 0.023 -0.262 0.361 0.176 
 (0.282) (0.277) (0.272) (0.268) (0.264) 
Cohort 8 0.585* -0.079 -0.491 0.251 0.122 
 (0.320) (0.315) (0.309) (0.304) (0.300) 
Cohort 9 0.573 -0.193 -0.590* 0.267 0.087 
 (0.358) (0.352) (0.346) (0.340) (0.335) 
Cohort 10 0.606 -0.169 -0.619 0.349 0.161 
 (0.396) (0.390) (0.384) (0.377) (0.372) 
Cohort 11 0.707 -0.212 -0.717* 0.327 0.125 
 (0.434) (0.428) (0.421) (0.415) (0.409) 
Cohort 12 0.638 -0.297 -0.853* 0.342 0.152 
 (0.472) (0.467) (0.460) (0.454) (0.449) 
Cohort 13 0.814 -0.185 -0.832* 0.452 0.243 
 (0.516) (0.510) (0.502) (0.496) (0.491) 
Cohort 14 0.888 -0.237 -0.874 0.457 0.298 
 (0.561) (0.554) (0.545) (0.538) (0.533) 
Cohort 15 0.961 -0.251 -1.069* 0.660 0.556 
 (0.607) (0.603) (0.600) (0.607) (0.627) 
Cohort 16 1.035     
 (0.725)     
Year -0.083*** -0.067*** -0.057*** -0.078*** -0.075*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Education -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Female -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Political 
Interest 
0.985*** 0.984*** 0.984*** 0.985*** 0.984*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Period μ 0.202 0.202 0.201 0.201 0.202 
Deviance 39776.267 39779.317 39772.641 39779.443 39784.118 
AIC 39822.267 39823.317 39816.641 39823.443 39828.118 
N obs 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 
N periods 21 21 21 21 21 
Note:  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
E  Estimation Details of the Bayesian  
Multinomial Hierarchical Logit Model 
This model was estimated using three sampling chains that ran for 
60,000 iterations with the first 20,000 dropped as a burn-in period, and 
were thinned to save every 40th iteration. The remaining 3000 samples 
from the posterior distribution for each parameter are used for statistical 
inference. To assess convergence we employed the potential scale reduc-
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tion factor (PSRF) suggested by Gelman and Rubin (1992) which recov-
ered values below 1.01 for all parameters. For the variance parameters of 
the random effects we employed the widely accepted inverse-Wishart 
prior distribution with degrees of freedom set equal to the number of 
random effects. Regression coefficients, on the other hand, were as-
signed a normally distributed prior with mean zero and very large vari-
ance (2 = 102). We employed the MCMCglmm R package (Hadfield 
2010) to do these calculations. 
F  Confidence Bands of Figure 3, 4 and 5 
To obtain confidence bands of the predicted values of Figure 3 we draw 
1,000 samples from the posterior distribution of the coefficients and 
random effects. This was done using the maximum likelihood estimates 
as staring values of the MCMC algorithm. We employed a normally dis-
tributed prior with mean zero and very large variance (2 = 102) for the 
coefficients, and a non-informative uniform prior for the variance pa-
rameter. The MCMC chain ran 15,000 iterations with the first 5,000 
dropped as a burn-in period, and saved every 10th iteration. The confi-
dence bands, shown in the plots of Figure 3 correspond to the 2.5th and 
97.5th percentiles of the predicted values and contain uncertainty due to 
variation in the estimation of both the independent variables and the 
period random effects. The confidence bands of the predicted values 
contained in Figures 4 and 5 employed the same procedure, but since the 
Bayesian Multinomial Hierarchical model was estimated via MCMC the 
posterior distribution of the parameters was immediately available from 
the estimation of the model.  
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